Wired has some advice for fixing the leaky RFID in passports issued by the U.S. State Department after Jan. 1.
I really wish I had replaced my passport this year, so I could avoid the RFID peril for a decade, by which time maybe they’ll have moved on to the next privacy-invasion scheme instead. As it is, though, I think I’ll hold off on the hammer approach and maybe consider this in the short term. Or I’ll just wrap the new passport in tinfoil.
Here’s a Guardian article on how insecure RFID passports already in use in Britain have proven to be. Proponents of the RFID passport like to say that sense the key that reads the passport’s data is printed on the passport itself, it’s secure. Well, a key is just an alphanumeric sequence — in the British case, one composed of “the passport number, the holder’s date of birth and the passport expiry date,” all of which is hackable, even by sheer guesswork, given enough time and computing power.